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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

CHARLES MURRAY, EXECUTOR,
Plaintiff

CASE NO. 312322

v

JUDGE: SUSTER

STATE OF OHIO
Defendant

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE PORTIONS OF
TESTIMONY OF DR. MOHAMMED
TAHIR PURSUANT TO EVID. R.
901 (A) AND 702

Defendant, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga
County and Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Marilyn B. Cassidy, move this honorable court to
exclude testimony that the state expects from Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Mohammed Tahir. There are
two principle grounds for this motion. First, plaintiff can authenticate neither the exhibit
purporting to be a" wood chip from the basement riser", nor the exhibit claimed to be the stain
from the wardrobe door, as required by Evid. R. 901. Hence, the proposed exhibits are
inadmissible evidence. Second, Dr. Tahir's opinions as to exhibits including the trousers, door
stain, wood chip, A59-1 and A59-2, and B-4-A (porch stain) do not meet a standard of reasonable
scientific certainty and are thus, not competent expert opinions under Ohio law. With specific
regard to the porch stain, no opinion is presented based on the witness' expertise. Hence, no

testimony is permissible. The unauthenticated exhibits and any incompetent expert testimony
should be excluded, all as is set forth in the memorandum attached hereto and incorporated herein
by reference.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY

Ma ·1yn .
Assistant osecutor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785

,_
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

I.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT AUTHENTICATE THE PURPORTED WOODCHIP AND
WARDROBE DOOR STAIN AS REQUIRED BY EVID. R. 901 AND THEY
SHOULD BE EXLUDED.

Defendant anticipates that Dr. Mohammad Tahir will attempt to testify as an expert as to
the origin of DNA evidence, specifically the blood- stain on a wood chip and the bloodstain on
the wardrobe door. Tahir is also expected testify relative to a stain from the porch (Exhibit B-41) Defendant submits that such testimony is impermissible under Ohio Evid. R. 901. Dr. Tahir's
testimony relates to items that cannot be accounted for during the last forty-five and one-half
years. Furthermore, the unknown whereabouts of this evidence indicate the possibility of

,_

tampering or confusion as to the identity of the evidence. Absent sufficient evidence as to the
identity and authenticity of the exhibit, these items must be excluded.
Evid. R. 901 provides, in pertinent part:

Requirement of Authentication or Identification
(A) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.

In authenticating any evidence,[ the proponent] must be able to "sufficiently identify" the
evidence in order for the testimony of the expert to be admitted. See, State v. Brown (1995), 107
Ohio App.3d 194; State v. Frye (1992), unreported, 1992 WL 303120. Furthermore, chain of
custody is part of the mandate set forth by Evid. R. 901, and [the proponent] has the burden of
establishing the chain of custody of a specific piece of evidence. Brown, 107 at 200. (citing State

-

v. Barzacchini (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 440, 457-8). In interpreting Rule 901, Ohio courts have
consistently held that the burden of establishing a chain of evidence to identify the specimens or

3

exhibits is upon [the proponent of the evidence}. State v. Moore (1973), 47 Ohio App. 2d 181,

_

183. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although the burden is not absolute, the proponent
must satisfy the court, with reasonable certainty, that confusion with the identity of the specimen
or the possibility of tampering did not occur. State v. Moore, supra.
Applying the law to the case at hand, it becomes clear that the Plaintiff fails to meet such
requirements. The evidence in question, the blood- stain on the wood chip and the bloodstain
from the wardrobe door, were both exhibits in the 1966 trial. From that point, until now, the
Plaintiff is unable to account for their whereabouts. Rather, thirty four and one-half years later
they are offered as evidence without any authentication or identification. Evidence to date
reveals gaps spanning years in a so-called chain of custody.
Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate a chain of custody, failure to sufficiently identify the
-

evidence, and failure to establish with reasonable certainty that substitution, alteration and
tampering did not occur, render absent the requirements for admissibility under Ohio Avid. R.
901. Hence, the exhibits purporting to be the stain on the wardrobe door, and the woodchip from
the basement riser cannot be admitted into evidence. See, Brown; Moore; Barzacchini.
The purpose of the Ohio Rules of Evidence requiring authentication and identification is
to ensure the credibility of evidence. Without evidence as to the whereabouts and conditions
related to these exhibits, indicia of authenticity are absent. As a result, the condition precedent to
admissibility established by Evid. R. 90l(A) is not satisfied and the evidence must be excluded.

4
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II.

OPINIONS OF TAHIR, IF ANY, ARE MADE WITHOUT THE REQUISITE LEVEL
OF SCIENTIFC CERTAINTY AND SHOULD BE EXCLUDED

Dr. Tahir will attempt to testify about DNA analyses conducted upon exhibits A59-l, A59-2,
woodchip from the basement riser, stain from the wardrobe door, and trousers of Samuel H.
Sheppard.

Dr. Tahir's conclusions are not made to a reasonable scientific certainty and

accordingly, are not permissible evidence.
In this jurisdiction, an expert opinion is competent only if it is held to a reasonable degree of

scientific certainty. In this context, " reasonable certainty" means "probability, " State v. Benner,
(1988) 40 Ohio St. 3d 301.

In a recent case, this court equated "extremely likely" to the word

"probable." Benner, supra citing State v. Buell (1986) 22 Ohio St. 3d 124.

·-

The Benner Court

reviewed definitions of the words" likely" and "probably" in the context of such opinions and
concluded that the term, "more than likely", a phrase that falls somewhere between "likely and
extremely likely", is an appropriate standard.
Below are excerpts of Dr. Tahir's deposition testimony which illustrate that any opinion he
has fails to meet the requisite standard:
•

WOODCHIP

Page 44

Q. Can you say that this is Richard Eberling's blood on this object?
A. No ...

Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say this is Richard Eberling's blood?
A. No.

Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that this test result somehow puts
Richard Eberling at the location where this blood was recovered?

5

-

A. My answer is the same thing. I cannot say it's his blood or his
DNA. No matter how many questions you ask on the same line,
bottom line is I cannot say that's his blood.

•

DOORSTAIN

Page 56

Q. Can you say Richard Eberling's blood is in 1-C?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's specific blood
was in this?

A. No. All I can see is he cant be excluded.
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that his blood was in the tube?

-

A. No sir.

Q. Did you ever tell anybody this is Richard Eberling's blood?
A. No.
Q.

Would it be scientifically accurate to say this is Richard
Eberling's blood?

A. No.
•TROUSERS
Page 64

Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that's Richard Eberling's blood
on that swatch of clothing?
A. I didn't say that.

Q. I'm saying if someone made that statement is that scientifically
accurate?

A. No.

6

-

• A-59-1

Q. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's DNA was in the

VAGINAL SMEAR

sperm fraction on this slide A-59-1?

Page 78

A. No.
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that this was Richard Eberling's sperm?
A. No sir.
Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that this is Richard eberling's
sperm based on this result?
A.

•

A-59-2

VAGINAL SMEAR
Page 88

-

No.

Q. Can you say that the 4.1 in A-59-2 came from a particular person?
A. No.
Q. Can you say it came from Richard Eberling?

A. No.

Q. Can you say his DNA was on that slide?
A. No.

Q. Is there Richard Eberling's sperm in this sperm fraction result
that you have?

A. No. That's multiple profile.
Q. Is Richard Eberling's sperm in there?
A. No.

III.

PORCH STAIN (EX B-4-A)
Plaintiff seeks to introduce expert testimony by a DNA expert, Mohammed Tahir.

In

.- addition to the argument set forth above, which Defendant submits applies to this exhibit as

7

-

well, Defendant asserts that the inconclusive result reached by Dr.Tahir in typing Exhibit B-4A (porch stain) is not admissible evidence for the reason that it fails to constitute opinion.
Moreover, any comment upon that inconclusive result will not assist the jury, and will likely
confuse and/or mislead the jury. Accordingly it should be excluded under both Evid. R. 702
and 403(A).
Evid. R. 702 sets the parameters under which an expert may testify. The state does not
dispute Tahir's credentials or qualification of an expert. However, an expert must demonstrate
some knowledge on the particular subject superior to that possessed by an ordinary juror. Scott

v. Yates (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 219, citing State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp, (1973),
36 Ohio St. 2d 151, 160. The test was set forth in State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp,

supra:

·-

"His qualification depends upon his possession of special knowledge which he can impart
to the jury, and which will assist them in regard to a pertinent matter, ... and it must appear
he has an opinion of his own, or is able to form one, on the particular question. "
Emphasis Added.

In the instant case, Dr. Tahir, on page two of his report dated February 3, 1997 states,

"DNA results for item #B-4-A (stain from porch) was typed with inconclusive results".
Thus, Dr. Tahir has no opinion, to a reasonable scientific certainty, as to what donors of the
stain may be included or excluded. For that reason, he has no information about that stain that
will assist the jury in evaluating it. Moreover, any comment by Dr. Tahir would amount to
sheer speculation and is likely to confuse or mislead the jury.

The very mention of an

inconclusive result by an expert such as Tahir is misleading because, although he is stating that
he can draw no scientifically accurate conclusion, a juror can surmise that the evidence is
somehow scientifically significant by virtue of the fact that he examined it. In view of the lack

8

-

of probative value coupled with the risk of misleading the jury, the State respectfully requests
that this evidence be excluded.

N. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff cannot authenticate the exhibits purporting to be a bloodstain from the basement
riser, stain from the wardrobe door as required by Evid. R. 901.
possession of the State of Ohio as of 1966.

These exhibits were in the

During the intervening thirty- four years, the

whereabouts of these exhibits are unknown for periods of years. Plaintiff cannot satisfy the
court with reasonable certainty that confusion in identification or tampering has not occurred.
In addition, Dr. Tahir has rendered no conclusions pursuant to his expert analysis which

meet a reasonable scientific certainty linking Richard Eberling to the stained trousers, the door
stain, the stain on wood chip from the basement riser, and the two vaginal smear slides. He
has no opinion derived from his expertise about the exhibit #B-4-A (porch stain). Under Evid.
R. 702, 403 (A) and Ohio case law, no testimony about the exhibit should be permitted.
Defendant respectfully requests that the court so direct.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY

9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support Excluding Portions of
Testimony by Dr. Mohammed Tahir was hand delivered to Terry Gilbert, attorney for
Plaintiff, at Court Room 20 (B) on the_}__ day of March 2000.
Respectfully,
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1

Q.

Yes.

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

Can you tell us who deposited the 4.1 in the

DQ Alpha?

5

MR. GILBERT:
of the person?

6'

7

Q.

Can you identify the person who

A.

In this report I have given the blood of Eberling,

10

and in this case that was the only one.

11

report I have two other people.

12

comparing with this, Eberling cannot be excluded.

13

Q.

Let me rephrase my question.

14

just said.

15

Richard Eberling?

The second

But in this

I understand what you

Can you tell me that that 4.1 came from

16

A.

Just saying that's him?

17

Q.

That's my question.

Did the 4.1 come from Richard

Eberling's DNA?

18

,. ..~

(BY MR. BOLAND)

deposited the 4.1?

8
9

You mean who -- The name

19

A.

No.

He cannot be excluded.

20

Q.

Can you say any of the other alleles in these

21

polymarkers, if any of those alleles came from

22

Richard Eberling?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

I understand.

25

Can you conclude that definitely?

He cannot be excluded.

That's all I can say.

His exclusion I'll get into.

question is can you say that came from him?
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Okay.

Is

3

there a test available to answer that question I

4

just asked you to determine if any of those alleles

5

in the polymarkers of the DQ Alpha came from Richard

6

Eberling?

7

determine that?

8

A.

10

Sure.

Is there a test that can be run to

If there is enough evidence sample, sure, you

can do it.

9

Q.

Given what we have now, the technology we have now
and these samples?

11

..,,... ,.,~
..

We'll get into this exclusion issue.

12

A.

Not to my knowledge.

13

Q.

Okay.

Can you tell me the number, the exact number,

of different people that contributed DNA to this

14

Item No. 3?
A.

4.1 there could be one person.
another person.
4.1 and 3.

Q.

1.1 and 2 could be

2 and 3 another.

And 4.1 and 2.

So you can make all these combinations.

So my question is therefore can you tell me an exact
number of people that contributed all this DNA?
it seven people that are here or is it four?
have an exact number?
range.

Is

Do you

That's what I'm asking, not a

Is there an exact number of people?

A.

I can calculate, but not right now.

Q.

so you can determine the exact number of people that
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE,

INC.
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....

stain on this object?

1
2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

Can you say that this is Richard Eberling•-

blood on this object?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Okay.

Did you ever tell anyone that Richard

Eberling's DNA was on this object?

7
8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's DNA
was in the blood on this object?

10
11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Okay.

Richard Eberling's blood?

13
14

A.

No.

I said he cannot be excluded.

My answer is

cannot be excluded.

15

16

Did you ever tell anyone that this was

Q.

Is it scientifically accurate to say this is Richard
Eberling's blood?

17

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Is it scientifically accurate to say that this test

20

result somehow puts Richard Eberling at the location

21

where this blood was recovered?

~·
b

~

~:

t

~
> ~ ••

i~

22

A.

My answer is the same thing.

I cannot say it's his

23

blood or his DNA.

No matter how many questions you

24

ask on the same line, bottom line is I cannot say

25

that's his blood.
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1

the little dusting brown blood that you tested?

Can

you say that?

21
A.

When you say that you mean identify him,

Q.

Is Richard Eberling's DNA in that blood?

5

A.

Not.

6

Q.

That's what I'm saying.

31

just him?

41
Like he can't be excluded?
Is his DNA blood in that

DNA?

7
8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Can you say this is Richard Eberling's blood in 1-C?

101

A.

No.

11

Q.

Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling 1 s
specific blood was in this?

121
131

A.

No.

All I can say is he can't be excluded.

14

Q.

Did you ever tell anyone that his blood was in the

.'

15.
}~ ..

16!

7t·;.

·c-

A.

No, sir.

J

Q.

Did you ever tell anybody this is Richard Eberling 1 s

191

A.

No, sir.

2al

Q.

Would it be scientifically accurate to say this is

I

·:···

ti-

~:~
~;

··11

' . ll'f -

.~;;:

tube?

1 7'

blood?

~~:~.
'~-\
. -- ·~-l't:

'~ ..,~f:

Richard Eberling 1 s blood?

21

.YJ~-

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Let's move on to Tahir Exhibit No. 1, your item

24

number is b-3-b-1.

You describe it as a blood stain

25

from Sam Sheppard's trousers.
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE,
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1

Q.

2

Eberling's blood on that swatch of clothing?

3

A.

I didn't say that.

4

Q.

I'm saying if someone made that statement, is that

5,

scientifically accurate?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Let's move on to the next item, which is your item

8

number on Tahir Exhibit No. 1, your first test

9

results,

10

':;..

_,.,,,.

Is it scientifically accurate to say that's Richard

Item A-59-1, which you describe as a vaginal

smear from Marilyn Sheppard.

11

A.

That's right.

12

Q.

Who did you receive that sample from?

13

A.

Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office.

14

Q.

When did you receive that?

15

A.

May 2, 1996.

16

Q.

And what were you told this was that you were

..;~:.

/·:

?:·.

r,.

~~,,

•..J;

\;:"

1::,~,'

- }:,
,"X;
;!·
~

f

1:r
·';o>

17

receiving, this individual package?

18

A.

Vaginal smears.

19

Q.

Who told you that?

20

A.

It was written on the package.

21

Q.

Did you document the receipt of that object the same

22,

way you did others?

23

A.

The same way.

24

Q.

How many people in your lab handled this object?

25

A.

I handled it.

They came in the one box.

MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE,
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1

somewhere on this mixed result?

2'

A.

No.

3

Q.

Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's
DNA was on the slide A-59-1?

4
5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's DNA
was in the sperm fraction on this slide?

7
81

A.

No.

9

Q.

Did you ever tell anyone that this was Richard
Eberling's sperm?

10
11

A.

No,

12

Q.

Is it scientifically accurate to say that this is
Richard Eberling's sperm based on this result?

13
14

sir.

A.

No.
(Recess taken.)

15
16

t

I~
~

'

Q.

(BY MR. BOLAND)

Dr. Tahir,

I want to go back

17

briefly to a couple issues regarding this slide and

18

some of your experience.

19

you've testified in rape cases in criminal trials?

You mentioned before

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And you've handled vaginal smear slides from rape

~
~

~-

~

victims in your lab?

22

~

~

~:

~

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And can you conclude if you look through one of

1'f!:

25

those cases that you had handled and saw two sperm
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE,

INC.
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1

Q.

2
3

'·

there?
A.

No idea.

41
5

Q.

The same possibilities exist that we mentioned?

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Handling?

7

A.

Handling.

8

Q.

And in your lab?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Do you know how many individual person's profiles

11

are included in the result in A-59-2, the exact

12

number of people it took to make this mixed stain?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Do you know if the person in A-59-2, for example,

15

who contributed the 1.2 in the DQ Alpha also

16

contributed the 3 allele in the DQ Alpha?

't

~·

"!;

17

A.

No,

18

Q.

Do you know if any of the DQ Alpha alleles that are

~

t;
,•

~.~

.,

Do you know how all these multiple contributors got

-~(

I

cannot tell you.

19

showing up there in that result are connected to any

20

of the polymarkers that are showing up?

21

which ones are connected to which?

Do you know

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Can you say that the 4.1 in A-59-2 came from a

24
25

particular person?
A.

No.

MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE,
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1

Q.

Can you say it came from Richard Eberling?

2,

A.

No.

31

Q.

Is Richard Eberling's DNA in the result A-59-2?

41

you say his DNA is in there?

5/

A.

No.

61

)

Q.

Can you say his DNA was on that slide?

A.

No.

8

Q.

Can you say that the 4.1 in the DQ Alpha came from

9

Richard Eberling and no one else?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Is there Richard Eberling's sperm in this sperm

12

fraction result that you have?

13

A.

No.

That's multiple profile.

14

Q.

Is Richard Eberling's sperm in there?

15

A.

No.

16
17

MR. GILBERT:
A.

When he's asking me these questions, you're asking

MR. GILBERT:

19
~.

'

/

Q.

,.
'-

r

k;
·'

r·

,~

... l"
1'·

251

(BY MR. BOLAND)

I'm not asking probability.

I'm

saying can you say definitely that Richard

221
231
241

So we make sure about

that.

20
21

It could be, right?

identification.

18

'.-

Can

Eberling's sperm is on this slide?
A.

I can't tell you the identification of him it's him.

Q.

Is his sperm on this slide?
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE,
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A.

No.

Q.

Can you identify any male who contributed sperm to
this slide?

7

A.

No.

Q.

Not Richard Eberling, some other person?

A.

No.

Q.

And this entire result you've reported here came
from the two sperm heads that you identified?

8
9

A.

No.

Two sperm heads were seen in the little portion

10

which I took, but the rest of the sample was in the

11

tube.

12

Q.

Your assumption is that there's more sperm in that
tube?

13
14

That was the presumptive test.

A.

Yes.

Because I can't take all and put it on the
In the tube like that thing is 30 or 40

15

slide.

16

microliter in the tube.

17

So then I tested the sperm in that.

18

sperms.

I took half a microliter.
So it's not two

19

Q.

You're assuming many more than two sperm?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

You actually only saw two sperm heads?

22

A.

Yes.

231

Q.

Are there items in these two reports, Tahir Exhibit
1 and Tahir Exhibit 2, that you tested twice?

24

25

A.

There may be, yes.
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE,

INC.

1992 WL 303120, State v, Frye, (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 1992)
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*303120
NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO
SUPREME
COURT
RULES
FOR
THE
REPORTING
OF
OPINIONS
IMPOSES
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMIT ATIO NS ON THE
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Jean Marie FRYE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14-92-3.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Union
County.
Oct. 21, 1992.
Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court.
Stuart A. Benis, Columbus, for defendant-appellant.
R. Larry Schneider, Pros. Atty., Rick Rodger,
Marysville, for plaintiff-appellee.
OPINON
HADLEY, Presiding Judge.
**1 This is an appeal by Defendant-Appellant, Jean
Marie Frye, ("Appellant") from the judgment and
sentencing of the Court of Common Pleas of Union
County, finding her guilty of complicity to aggravated
trafficking in violation of R.C. 2923.03 and
sentencing her to not less than 3 years nor more than
15 years.

-

Page 1
On January 27, 1991, at approximately 1: 30 a. m.
appellant and Moore arrived at Salmons' residence in
Marysville. During this time, Moore gave Salmons a
quarter ounce (approximately 7 grams) of cocaine
with appellant present. Salmons paid Moore $460 for
the cocaine and appellant gave him $10 change.
Appellant stated during the transaction that she should
have not gotten Salmons the "shit" (cocaine) as he did
not call her anymore. She also stated that from now
on, he would deal more with Moore than her.
After appellant and Moore left, Salmons and his
residence were searched again and the cocaine was
confiscated by deputy Nelson.
Moore pied guilty to aggravated trafficking, a fourth
degree felony, and was awaiting sentencing when he
testified at appellant's trial. Appellant was charged
with complicity to aggravated trafficking, a third
degree felony. As appellant had a prior felony drug
abuse conviction, the charge of complicity to
aggravated trafficking was enhanced to a felony in the
second degree.
A jury trial was held on December 30th and 31st of
1991. The jury found appellant guilty of complicity to
aggravated trafficking. Thereupon, the trial court
sentenced appellant to not less than 3 years nor more
than 15 years. Appellant timely appeals from the
judgment and sentencing and asserts the following six
assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I

Union County Sheriff's Department deputy Wertz
approached Rick Salmons ("Salmons") about making a
drug purchase from appellant. Salmons agreed as he
thought it would help reduce his sentence for a
pending driving under suspension charge.

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
instruct the jury on the entrapment defense when
there was sufficient evidence of entrapment, even
though defendant denied one or more elements of
the crime.

Salmons contacted appellant between 10-15 times
before she agreed to help him purchase cocaine. On
January 26, 1991, appellant contacted Salmons to
arrange for the purchase of a quarter ounce of cocaine
for $450 to be delivered that evening at Salmons'
residence. Prior to the arrival of appellant and her
boyfriend, Terry Moore, ("Moore") Deputy Nelson
placed a microcassette recorder in Salmons' living
room to record the drug transaction and searched
Salmons and his residence for any controlled
substances. No controlled substances were found.
Deputy Nelson gave Salmons $460 to purchase the
cocaine. Then Deputy Nelson hid in a closet in
Salmons' house during the drug transaction.

Appellant asserts that the trial court should have
given the jury instruction on the defense of entrapment
whether or not appellant denied that she aided or
abetted Moore in the sale of cocaine to Salmons.
**2 Appellant cites Jacobson v. United States
(1992), --- U.S.----, --- S.Ct. ----, 118 L.Ed.2d 174,
in support of her first assignment of error. Jacobson,
supra, is distinguishable from the case sub Judice. In
Jacobson, the government not only solicited Jacobson
for 2 1/2 years but also induced him to purchase the
magazines. Herein, Salmons only called appellant
about the possibility of purchasing cocaine from her.
There is no testimony that Salmons pressured or
induced appellant into assisting him in the purchase of
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cocaine. Appellant then contacted Salmons when she
and Moore had made arrangements to get the cocaine
from Moore's supplier in Columbus.
Appellant also cites State v. Haller (January 24,
1989), Franklin App. No. 87 AP 143, unreported, in
support of her assignment of error. However, Haller,
supra, is distinguishable from the case sub Judice.
Herein, Salmons did not try to manipulate appellant in
arranging the drug transaction or in the conversation
during the drug transaction.
In State v. Dotson (1987), 35 Ohio App.3d 135,
139, the court stated that a person is not entrapped
when police officers merely present the opportunity to
commit a crime. Under these circumstances, craft
and pretense may be used. The court further stated
where there is credible evidence that a defendant has
the predisposition and criminal design to commit the
acts and that he was merely provided with an
opportunity to commit those acts, he has not been
entrapped. Id. at 139. Herein, appellant was only
given the opportunity to commit the crime.

-

.-

Appellant has the burden of establishing the defense
of entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence.
State v. Doran (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 187, 193-194.
Once the defense of entrapment is established the state
can rebut the entrapment defense by showing that the
defendant was merely provided with the opportunity
to commit the offense and defendant was predisposed
to commit the crime. State v. Italiano (1985), 18
Ohio St.3d 38. If the defendant fails to establish that
he was entrapped, the state is relieved of its burden of
proving defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime. State v. Cheraso (1988), 43 Ohio App.3d 221,
222.
In the case sub Judice, appellant on direct
examination denied any participation in the sale of
cocaine to Salmons. However, appellant's statements
in the tape recorded transaction establish that appellant
was well aware of the drug culture and the
transaction.
Herein, appellant has not established by a
preponderance of the evidence she was entrapped.
Appellant testified that Salmons called her 10-15 times
about purchasing cocaine. However, appellant does
not state that Salmons threatened her or in anyway
pressured her into selling him cocaine nor does
appellant contend that she had told Salmons no and to
quit calling her.
In fact, appellant denies any
participation in the drug transaction. She testified that
she did not know that a drug transaction was to occur
that evening at Salmons' residence.
Appellant
testified that she went with Moore without any idea
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that he planned to sell cocaine to Salmons.
**3 Entrapment occurs when the agents or officers
of the government originate the idea of a crime and
then induces another person to commit the crime.
(Citations omitted)
However, one cannot be
entrapped when she has no knowledge of the crime.
Appellant cannot argue on one hand that before the
drug transaction took place, she was totally unaware
that Moore had planned on selling cocaine to Salmons,
and also say she was entrapped because Salmons
called her 10-15 times without showing how she was
induced by Salmons.
Whereas appellant did not establish the defense of
entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, the
trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury
instruction of entrapment and appellant's first
assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II
The trial court abused it's discretion and violated
defendant's due process right [sic] in admitting
selective tape recordings of conversations between
defendant and a confidential informant when
portions of the tapes were inaudible, when the tape
was not presented to defense until shortly before
trial, when a deputy sheriff with no audio expertise
altered the audio by dubbing a microcassette into
[sic] a regular cassette tape on his home stereo
system to defendant's surprise, when the trial court
limited inquiry into differences in the audio
recording in the microcassette and cassette versions,
when the entire conversation between the
confidential informant and defendant was not
recorded and where the parties to the conversation
had trouble remembering their conversations.
Appellant's second assignment of error for purposes
of discussion will be subdivided into four assignments.
A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the tape recordings when portions of the
tape recordings were inaudible and the entire
conversation between appellant, Moore and Salmons
was not recorded.
A tape recording in order to be admissible must be
authentic, accurate and trustworthy. Admission into
evidence of tape recordings containing inaudible
portions is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court. In determining whether or not to admit a
tape recording, the trial court must decide if the
unintelligible portions of the tape are so substantial as
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to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy. State v.
Gotis (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 282, 283. See, also
United States v. Mitchell (1976), 559 F.2d 31, cert.
denied (1977), 431 U.S. 933; and United States v.
Slade (1980), 627 F.2d 293.
The tape was only thirty minutes in length,
however, appellant and Moore remained at Salmons'
residence for at least forty minutes. After reviewing
both the microcassette and the cassette, it is apparent
that the tapes recorded the entire drug transaction.
The fact that the trial court permitted the jury to hear
only the portion of the tape concerning the drug
transaction and did not admit that portion of the tape
which contained mere conversation unrelated to the
drug transaction, was not prejudicial to appellant.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the
tapes into evidence.
B. The tape was not given to the defense until
shortly before trial.

.-.

**4 Appellant contends that the state knew of the
tape recording prior to December 23, 1991, when
appellant was notified of its existence. Appellant
received a transcript of the tape on December 24th
and listened to the tape on the 27th of December.
Appellant filed a motion in limine regarding the tape
recording on December 27, 1991.
In order to find reversible error in admitting the
tapes, appellant must demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence and that
she was prejudiced as a result of the state's
State v. Fricke
noncompliance with discovery.
(1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 331, 332.
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tape was altered in any way. After careful review of
both tape recordings, this court cannot find any
discrepancies between the two tapes. Appellant upon
learning that the microcassette had been transferred to
a larger cassette did not request a continuance or
request an in camera inspection by the trial court.
As there were no differences in content between the
two tapes, the trial court did not err in limiting
appellant's inquiry into the tapes and admitting the
tapes into evidence.
D. The trial court erred in admitting the tapes when
the parties to the conversation had trouble
remembering their conversation.
Appellant contends that some of the statements were
changed when the tape recording was transcribed.
However, since the transcript of the tape was not
allowed into evidence, this issue is not properly before
this court.
Next appellant contends that it was difficult to
conclude who said what in the tape and that the
witnesses had trouble remembering the conversation
of that evening independently of the tape. Appellant's
contention does not preclude the admission of the tape
but goes only to the weight afforded the tape and the
credibility of the witnesses. See, State v. Cooper
(October 2, 1985), Logan App.
No. 8-84-31,
unreported.
Whereas the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the tapes into evidence, appellant's
second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III

Appellant has failed to show that she was prejudiced
by the state's failure to disclose the tape recording
prior to the 23rd of December; assuming that the
state was aware of the existence of the tape recording.
Appellant did not request a continuance nor was there
a showing that appellant was ill-prepared at trial.
Therefore, the admission of the tape recordings was
not in error.
C. The original microcassette tape recording was
altered by the deputy sheriff when he recorded the
events onto a regular cassette to be played at trial to
appellant's surprise and the trial court limited inquiry
into the differences between the tape recordings.
~-

Appellant contends that the tape was altered when it
was transferred to a larger cassette.
However,
appellant has failed to show that the content of the

The trial court erred in entering a finding of guilty
when the defendant was denied her sixth amendment
right to competent counsel when her attorney failed
to file a motion to suppress statements which
severely affected her defense.
**S Appellant contends that her appointed counsel,
prior to her hiring of Mr. Benis, was ineffective as
she failed to file a motion to suppress her statements
made to the deputies on May 22, 1991. However,
appellant has failed to show that her statement to the
deputies was used at trial. Appellant does not cite
anywhere in the trial transcript where her statement
was used to impeach or cross-exam her. Even if her
statement was used, appellant did not object. As
appellant's statement was not used in the trial, this
assignment of error is not properly before this court.
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See, Paulin v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1974),
37 Ohio St.2d 109.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV
The trial court abused its discretion in not granting
relief from appellant's failure to file a pretrial
motion to suppress statements within 35 days after
arraignment.
Appellant now asserts that the trial court erred in
not allowing her motion to suppress even though it
was untimely filed. Appellant argues that because she
hired new counsel on December 5, 1991, the court
should have granted the motion to suppress filed on
December 11, 1991, as the hiring of new counsel was
good cause for waiving the time requirement set forth
in Crim.R. 12(C).

-

Crim.R. 12(C) states that all pretrial motions except
as provided in Rule 7(E) and Rule 16(F) shall me
made within 35 days of arraignment or seven days
before trial, whichever is earlier. (emphasis added).
The court in the interest of justice may extend the time
for making pretrial motions. Herein, appellant was
arraigned on October 16, 1991.
The motion to
suppress was not filed until 55 days after arraignment.
Therefore, the motion was not made in a timely
manner.
Appellant argues that the hiring of new counsel is
good cause to waive the time requirements in Crim.R.
12(C). However, appellant has not shown that the
state used her statement at trial or how she was
prejudiced, if the statement was used. Appellant's
attorney does not specifically point out where her
statement was used at trial. Nor was appellant's
statement marked as an exhibit or admitted into
evidence.
A bare assertion by appellant is not
sufficient to show that the trial court abused its
discretion in overruling her motion to suppress as
untimely. Therefore, appellant's fourth assignment of
error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V

-

The trial court abused its discretion and usurped
the function of the jury as a factfinder [sic] in ruling
that defendant could not mention the chain of
custody of the cocaine in her closing argument, and
in taking the factual issue of whether the cocaine
admitted as evidence at the trial was the same
substance that was allegedly sold by the defendant
away from the jury.
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Appellant asserts that the trial court's statement to
the jury that the issue of chain of custody of the
cocaine was not a determination for the jury, thereby
not allowing appellant to comment on whether the
cocaine produced at trial was the same substance as
that sold to Salmons.

**6 A strict chain of custody is not required before
physical evidence will be admitted into trial. State v.
Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382. The state needs
only to establish that it is reasonably certain that
substitution, alteration or tampering did not occur.
Furthermore, any breaks in the chain of custody goes
to the weight afforded to the evidence not to its
admissibility.
State v. Blevins ( 1987), 36 Ohio
App.3d 147, 150.
See, also, State v. Nichols
(December 11, 1991), Allen App.
No. 3-90-35,
unreported;
Srate v. Watson (August 27, 1990),
Logan App. No. 8-89-6, unreported.
The state established the chain of custody of the
cocaine through the testimony of Deputy Nelson and
the BCI chemist, Gregory Kiddon.
Appellant
objected to the admission of the cocaine on the basis
of chain of custody. As the chain of custody was
reasonably established, the trial court properly
overruled appellant's objection.
Appellant's attorney during closing argument began
to comment on the chain of custody. The state
objected and the trial court sustained the objection.
Thereafter the trial court instructed the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the question and
issue of chain of custody is not one for you to make
a determination on here today, and not part of your
function as fact finders in this case.
As the issue of chain of custody goes to the weight
afforded the evidence not its admissibility, the trial
court erred in instructing the jury that this was not an
issue before them. However, in view of the trial
court's instruction to the jury (you are the sole judges
of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence) and the fact that appellant did
not show that the chain of custody was broken or that
the cocaine introduced at trial had been tampered,
altered or substituted, the error was harmless.
Therefore, appellant's fifth assignment of error is
overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VI
The trial court violated defendant's rights to
confront witnesses and deprived defendant of a fair
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trial when it abused its discretion by limiting legally
admissible evidence bearing directly on credibility
of adverse witnesses, by allowing the prosecutor to
read a transcript that was previously excluded as
inaccurate of the alleged sale to the jury in closing
argument but in refusing to allow defendant to use
the same transcript as an aid to cross examine [sic]
witnesses during the trial.
As appellant's sixth assignment of error addresses
two separate and distinct issues, they will be discussed
separately.
A. The trial court erred in allowing Moore to claim
the privilege against self-incrimination when
questioned about other drug transactions on crossexamination by appellant and limited appellant's
questioning of other witnesses.
Appellant's attorney states in his brief that the trial
court allowed Moore to plead the fifth amendment
during cross-examination about "specific, legitimate
details about the transaction (in question) on cross
examination [sic]."
**7 Upon review of appellant's attorney crossexamination of Moore, he asked 230 questions of
Moore.
Out of the 230 questions, Moore only
claimed the privilege of self-incrimination once. The
question by appellant's attorney in which Moore
claimed the privilege of self-incrimination was not
related to the transaction in question, but to uncharged
Appellant's attorney
misconduct of the witness.
questioned Moore as to his bias, memory and his
credibility. The one question that Moore refused to
answer, did not deprive appellant of her right to
confront this witness or deprive her of a fair trial.
See, State v. Williams (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 156.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing
Moore to plead the fifth amendment on that one
question.
Next appellant's attorney in his brief argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by limiting the crossexamination of Deputy Nelson about the differences in
the tapes. As this court stated in assignment of error
number 2(C), the tapes did not contain any
discrepancies, therefore, the trial court did not err in
not allowing appellant's attorney to cross-examine
deputy Nelson on this issue.

-

Appellant's attorney in his brief then asserts that the
trial court limited the cross-examination of Salmons
regarding the charge for which he was jailed.
Appellant's attorney did cross-examine Salmons as to
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any reduction he received for his driving during
suspension charge by becoming an informant. The
trial court ruled that appellant's attorney could not ask
Salmons if he was in jail but could ask him if he was
under sentence.
Again appellant's attorney is
implying that one question propounded to a witness
constitutes a denial of appellant's right to confront
witnesses. This one question does not amount to a
violation of appellant's sixth amendment rights.
Appellant's attorney in his brief also asserts that the
trial court erred when it prevented appellant from
testifying why she was afraid of Moore and why he
would lie against her. The trial court did not deny
appellant's attorney from eliciting testimony from
appellant regarding why she was afraid of Moore.
The trial court allowed appellant to testify that Moore
tried to kill her, their relationship was violent, that she
was afraid of Moore, and that Moore was testifying
against her because she had him arrested for domestic
violence on two occasions, the last one being after the
sale of cocaine to Salmons. Therefore, there was no
error committed by the trial court.
Next appellant's attorney argues that these incidents
taken as a whole amount to a denial of appellant's
sixth amendment right and a denial of a fair trial.
These four incidents taken separately or as a whole,
do not amount to a denial of appellant's right to
confront witnesses or amount to a denial of a right to
a fair trial. Therefore, the trial court did not deny
appellant of her sixth amendment right to confront
witnesses.
B. The trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor
to read from the transcript of the tape in closing
argument but did not allow appellant's attorney to use
the transcript during cross-examination of the state's
witnesses.
**8. Appellant's attorney filed a motion in limine
regarding the admissibility of the tapes and the
transcript of the tape. The trial court ruled that the
transcript would not be allowed into evidence, but the
parties could use the transcript to follow along with
the tape during the trial court's hearing on appellant's
motion in limine.
Appellant's attorney now argues that the prosecutor
read from the transcript of the tape to the jury in his
closing argument. However, appellant's attorney does
not specifically point out where the prosecutor read
from the transcript during his closing argument.
Since the transcript of the tape, of which appellant's
attorney received a copy, was not admitted or attached
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this court.
Appellant's attorney next argues that the trial court
erred by not allowing him to use the transcript for
purposes of cross-examination. However, appellant's
attorney is the one who objected to the use of the
transcript and the trial court agreed. Appellant's
attorney did not want the transcript put into evidence,
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therefore, he cannot complain when the trial court did
not allow him to use the transcript on crossexamination. Therefore, appellant's sixth assignment
of error is overruled and the judgment and sentencing
of the trial court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
EV ANS and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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